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Abstract— Despite previous attempts to clarify what we
understand as ambiguity and to analyse its nature, research
on the field reveals a lack of uniformity on its theoretical
treatment, accentuated by a tendency to not to specify which are
the commitments embodied in the proposed representation and
resolution techniques. This paper analyses the phenomenon of
ambiguity from a multidisciplinary perspective and in contrast
to other semantic issues, in particular vagueness and generality
as discussed in philosophy and polysemy and homonymy as
in linguistics. The theoretical considerations are then briefly
matched to the current trends in representation and resolution,
concluding that the field could benefit from richer semantic
representations and, fundamentally, from considering an un-
recognised step: that of deciding, in context, whether there is
something that need to be disambiguated or not.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most natural language terms do not have precise univer-
sally agreed definitions that fix their meaning. Rather, words
used in human communication can be associated to a wide
and ever changing variety of senses and are versatile enough
to fit new and detached scenarios (such as metaphors). It is
thus not surprising that the phenomenon of ambiguity, often
referred as concerning a word or phrase displaying multiple
possible meanings, is pervasive in human communication,
occurring at all levels of linguistic analysis [1], [2]: Words
have multiple senses and can belong to different syntactic
categories, sentences may admit several Logical Forms (syn-
tactic trees) and speech acts can be ambiguous in their type
(e.g. a sentence may be an assertion or a warning).
Research on the field of Ambiguity is highly multidis-
ciplinary; Philosophical interest dates well back to Ancient
Greek philosophy [3], [4] and, although traditionally it has
predominantly considered it a mere obstruction for good
philosophy [5], different views on the nature of human
language arising fundamentally in the 20th century (e.g.
[6], [7]) have contributed to the philosophical efforts on
clarifying the concept of ambiguity with respect to related
phenomena (such as vagueness) and on understanding its role
in natural language (e. g. [8], [9], [10], [11]). Meanwhile,
work in the emergent fields of Linguistics and Cognitive
Science have joined this quest, the former by analysing
ambiguity with respect to other linguistic phenomena [12],
[2], [13] and on elucidating tests for it’s detection [14] and
the latter shedding light on human strategies for resolution
[15], [16], [17], [18], some of which suggest that ambiguity
may be a feature that makes communication more efficient
[15], [1], which has also been suggested in the case of
vagueness. Finally, research on Artificial Intelligence (AI)
has embraced the challenge of Word Sense Disambiguation
(WSD), the computational identification of meaning for
words in context [19] and has delivered substantial advances
in representation and resolution (see [19] for a complete
survey). Multidisciplinarity has enriched the research on
ambiguity, enabling feedback between philosophical and
linguistic theory, cognitive models and experiments and
implementations. However, it has also lead to difficulties
due to different domains using terminology in different ways
and/or avoiding explicit commitments on the nature of the
phenomenon at hand. Such scenario motivates the following
part of this piece of research.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
clarifies the terminology of related phenomena, facilitating
the subsequent analysis of the nature of ambiguity in section
III. Following is a discussion of the implications for the
representation and resolution in section IV and in Section
V we close with some final remarks.
II. WHAT IS NOT AMBIGUITY.
In this section we first describe our take on some of
the related concepts that get often entangled with that of
ambiguity, with the aim of clearly differentiating them.
A. Vagueness and Generality
Vagueness is ubiquitous in language [20] and arises when-
ever a concept or linguistic expression admits of borderline
cases of application [21]. Vagueness occurs both when the
applicability of a predicate depends on parameters whose
thresholds are undetermined, such as in ”tall” (height), and
when there is a lack of clarity on which attributes or
conditions are essential to fix the meaning of a given term,
so that it is controversial how it should be defined [22], [23].
While in some literature in cognitive linguistics no clear
distinction is made between vagueness and generality (e.g.
[24], [8], [11]), here we do differentiate them sharply, on
the basis that generality doesn’t display uncertainty. For
example, if we compare the statements ‘I am in my twenties’
and ‘I am 29’ we find that, although the first sentence is
more general, it is not at all vague: It is true for me being
any age within the twenties and false otherwise [25].‘I am
approaching 30’, however is vague, because it doesn’t have
a clear range of applicability.
B. Polysemy and homonymy
Both polysemy and homonymy are studied in linguistics
and denote the capacity for a sign (such as a word, phrase,
or symbol) to have multiple meanings or senses. While in
the former those senses are related by contiguity of meaning,
in the later they convey unrelated meanings, being often the
result of mere linguistic coincidence. Thus, if they where to
be represented in a semantic field, polysemous terms would
be closely clustered senses while homonymous ones would
be totally disconnected [8], [26].
The accounts of the notion of polysemy in cognitive
science and linguistic (e.g. [9], [26], [17], [18]) literature and
that of conceptual vagueness in [22], [23] can be considered
somewhat parallel, given that the idea of a well defined
number of precise senses in polysemy is often relaxed.
Moreover, when it is viewed from a cognitive perspective,
the phenomenon emerges as a natural, indeed necessary
consequence of the human ability to think flexibility [27].
III. ON THE NATURE OF AMBIGUITY
So far, we’ve attempted to depict a general picture of some
of the main aspects of semantic heterogeneity in natural
language that are normally conflated and/or confused with
that of ambiguity. We now address our understanding of the
nature of ambiguity, which, despite the generalised lack of
consensus, a surprisingly small amount of papers from the
reviewed literature, particularly in the WSD domain (e.g.
[28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [17], [33]) explicitly define. Most
definitions of the phenomenon at hand go along these lines:
“Ambiguity is a semantic property. [...] An expression
is ambiguous if it has two or more distinct denotations —
that is, if it is associated with more than one region of the
meaning space”[9]
“Semantic lexical ambiguity is of two types. Polysemy
refers to words whose several meanings are related [...].
Homonymy refers to words whose various definitions are
unrelated”[16]
Most of the accounts of ambiguity are limited at pointing
at the existence of more than one denotation or meaning,
in line with the etymological origin of the term, like the
first definition above. However, one of the hard problems
in giving an account of ambiguity is to figure out what
are the objects that are said to be ambiguous[34], which
remains unspecified. Another very common position is to
narrow down the scope to Lexical Ambiguity and describe
it as a property of terms, comprising both Polysemy and
Homonymy [8], [9] and, in other cases, only Homonymy
[35], [11], [26]. Almost the totality of the experimental and
computational research reviewed fits this approach, explicitly
or implicitly.
This account seems, however, unsatisfactory, as it leaves
some open questions such as:
• If lexical ambiguity is a property of natural language
terms, how do we explain the existence of ambiguity
in other linguistic levels such as structural or syntactic,
homophone and pragmatic? [36]
• If polysemy is not to be included under the umbrella of
ambiguity as suggested in [35], how do we explain the
need for disambiguation in many scenarios involving
polysemous words? [14] And conversely, if polysenmia
is to be systematically included, how do we justify
constant unnecessary disambiguation?
• If ambiguity is a property of words of natural language,
how do we justify the impact of context, not only on
the result of the disambiguation, but on the need or not
for disambiguation (i.e. on the presence of ambiguity).
In order to provide tentative answers to these questions,
we suggest characterising ambiguity not as a property of
terms but as a phenomenon arising in communication, as a
consequence of different manifestations of the underdeter-
mination of natural language, in which different choices in
the sense of a term, the LF of a sentence or the pragmatics
of a speech act, lead to fundamentally different semantics of
the whole, which can only be elucidated individually. E.g.
In the sentence ‘I went to the bank’, the semantics given to
bank drastically change the meaning of the utterance, unlike
in ”my cousin is tall”, wherever we place the threshold for
tallness. Moreover, the disambiguation will normally require
knowledge of the semantic variability of the terms into play,
the syntactic rules of the language and the context of the
communication act.
Moreover and unsurprisingly, ambiguity occurs almost
invariably in the presence of homonyms, given that scenarios
where two unrelated senses of a term don’t have different
implications in the meaning of the whole are at least in-
frequent. However, in the otherwise more frequent case of
polysemy, it is expected and desirable that communication
can carry on within a reasonable degree of vagueness and
without the need of fully disambiguating the involved terms,
thus following Grice [37] methodological principle: ”Senses
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”.
IV. REPRESENTATION, DETECTION AND
RESOLUTION
A. Representation
Following the considerations of sections II and III, compu-
tational frameworks able to handle ambiguity should involve
a representation of natural language, if possible featuring
its semantic heterogeneity, as well as a representation of
the context in which the ambiguity occurs. In the reviewed
works the latter is almost invariably represented by a vector
model and the former by WordNet [28], [31], [32] or, less
frequently, clustered vector models. This piece of research
suggests, however, that better characterisations of the seman-
tic heterogeneity of language could lead to improved results
in the disambiguation.
B. Detection and Resolution
The main insight that we derive from section III is that,
given that semantic heterogeneity doesn’t necessarily imply
ambiguity, particularly in the case of polysemous terms with
closely related senses, then:
• Current approaches disambiguating polysemy may be
overprecisifying the semantics of those terms, which
would contradict Grice’s principle.
• Strategies to assess whether words need to be disam-
biguated must be developed.
Additionally, it is expected to obtain benefits from resolving
with subsets of senses instead of a complete disambiguation
when possible, for example along the lines proposed in [38]
V. FINAL REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The term Ambiguity is ironically widely used in sub-
stantially different senses in different fields and, especially
in the computational literature, the tendency is rather to
avoid theoretical commitments. We believe, however, that
theoretical analyses of the problems in hand often help with
identifying challenges and can shed light on possible ways
to overcome them.
In this paper we take a very specific (and potentially
controversial) standpoint on the concept of ambiguity and
we explore both the theoretical and practical implications
with respect to techniques for representation and resolution.
We conclude that our perspective draws from multidisci-
plinary research and could easily accommodate not only the
phenomenon of lexical but also syntactic or structural and
pragmatic ambiguity. Moreover, it highlights some aspects
that may be currently overlooked in WSD, in particular
the contextualised decision on whether disambiguation is
necessary, and places interest on holistic approaches for
the representation of language as an evolving heterogeneous
semantic field
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